Research
Security Design under Common-Value Competition [SSRN]
Econometrica, 94(5), 1717-1759, 2026
When bidders with dispersed information compete for a common-value investment opportunity, they offer debt financing due to the winner's curse effect and the entrepreneur's informed-selection effect. These effects dominate the signaling effect.
Best Paper in Finance Theory on the Job Market awarded by FTG
WFA PhD Candidate Award for Outstanding Research
Share Issues versus Share Repurchases, with Philip Bond and Hongda Zhong [SSRN]
Accepted, Management Science
In a unified framework of share issuances and repurchases, firms' asymmetric choices of transaction methods in issuances and repurchases and the size-method relation in issuances are natural outcomes of an informational friction.
Security Design under Two-Sided Asymmetric Information [SSRN] [slides]
When a firm designs a security-bid auction with both the firm and the bidding investors having private information, the firm requires payments in the strongly steepest security family, both for signaling and for enhancing competition among investors.
Presentations: FIRS, EEA-ESWM
(Non-)Binding Shareholder Voting and Trading, with Markus Parlasca and Paul Voss (work in progress)
We study whether binding or non-binding shareholder voting is more effective at information aggregation when shareholders can trade before voting.
Presentations: St. Gallen Financial Economics Workshop