Welcome! I am a Senior Research Fellow at the UCL School of Management, and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance at the UCL Department of Economics. Before this, I worked as an Assistant Professor of Finance at Tsinghua University. I am a member of the Finance Theory Group. I received my PhD in Finance from the London School of Economics.
My research interests are Corporate Finance and Microeconomic Theory.
Email: yue.yuan [at] ucl.ac.uk
Curriculum Vitae (updated 03/2025)
Working Papers
Security Design under Common-Value Competition [SSRN] [slides]
Revise and Resubmit, Econometrica
When bidders with dispersed information compete for a common-value investment opportunity, they offer debt financing due to the winner's curse effect and the entrepreneur's informed-selection effect. These effects dominate the signaling effect.
Best Paper in Finance Theory on the Job Market awarded by FTG, 2021
WFA PhD Candidate Award for Outstanding Research, 2021
Presentations: Paris School of Economics, University of Mannheim, Five Star Workshop, NYU Shanghai, FTG Fall Meeting, OxFIT, University of Rochester, EEA-ESEM, CMES, AMES, WFA, Barcelona GSE Summer Forum, City University of Hong Kong, UCL, New Economic School, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, SAIF, HEC Lausanne, Copenhagen Business School, Tsinghua PBCSF, Chinese University of Hong Kong, University of Washington Foster, University of Amsterdam, Tsinghua SEM, EEA-ESWM, Corporate Finance Day, LSE
Share Issues versus Share Repurchases, with Philip Bond and Hongda Zhong [SSRN] [slides]
In a unified framework of firms' share issues and repurchases, firms' asymmetric choices of issue and repurchase methods emerge as a natural outcome under an informational friction.
Presentations: Renmin University of China, AFA, SFS Cavalcade Asia-Pacific, University of Rochester*, Corporate Finance Day*, EFA, BSE Summer Forum, FTG Summer Meeting, Esade Spring Workshop, Tsinghua PBCSF, SGF Conference, CICF, LSE
Security Design under Two-Sided Asymmetric Information [SSRN] [slides]
When a firm designs a security-bid auction with both the firm and the bidding investors having some private information, the firm requires payments in the strongly steepest security family, both for signaling and for enhancing competition among investors.
Presentations: FIRS, EEA-ESWM
Teaching
Lecturer, UCL, 2023-
Corporate Finance (master)
Lecturer, Tsinghua University, 2021-23
Advanced Theories of Corporate Finance (PhD)
Teaching Assistant, LSE, 2016-21
FM212 Principles of Finance (undergraduate)
FM409 Risk Management in Financial Markets (master)
FM430 Asset Markets (master)
FM441 Derivatives (master)
FM473 Financial Markets (master)
Teaching Assistant, LSE Summer School, 2016-18
FM230 Alternative Investments
FM250 Finance
FM350 Advanced Corporate Finance
FN209 Corporate Finance in a Global World